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ABSTRACT
There are different requirements on cybersecurity of industrial
control systems and information technology systems. This fact
exacerbates the global issue of hiring cybersecurity employees
with relevant skills. In this paper, we present KYPO4INDUSTRY
training facility and a course syllabus for beginner and intermediate
computer science students to learn cybersecurity in a simulated
industrial environment. The training facility is built using open-
source hardware and software and provides reconfigurable modules
of industrial control systems. The course uses a flipped classroom
format with hands-on projects: the students create educational
games that replicate real cyber attacks. Throughout the semester,
they learn to understand the risks and gain capabilities to respond to
cyber attacks that target industrial control systems. Our described
experience from the design of the testbed and its usage can help
any educator interested in teaching cybersecurity of cyber-physical
systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) provide vital services, such as elec-
tricity, water treatment, and transportation. Although these systems
were formerly isolated, they became connected with information
technology (IT) systems and even to the Internet. Figure 1 shows
the ISA-95 enterprise reference architecture that describes the con-
nection between the functions of ICS and IT systems [29]. This
connection of processes in the cyberspace and the physical world
has reduced costs and enabled new services. However, the ICS as-
sets became vulnerable to new threats and ever-evolving cyber
threat landscape [41].
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Figure 1: The ISA-95 architecture: A hierarchical model of
enterprise-control system integration [29]
ICSs aremade tomaintain the integrity and availability of produc-
tion processes and to sustain conditions of industrial environments.
Their hardware and software components are often custom-built
and tightly integrated. However, IT systems use off-the-shelf hard-
ware and software and have different operational characteristics
and security objectives [25].
Traditional cybersecurity courses are falling short in training
ICS security [7], since they focus on exploiting and defending IT
assets. To teach ICS security, a training facility (testbed) is needed to
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model a real-world ICS system [17] and to provide hands-on expe-
rience. However, building and operating a realistic cyber-physical
testbed using standard industrial equipment is expensive. It incor-
porates equipment such as programmable logic controllers (PLC),
input/output modules, sensors, actuators, and other devices.
This paper addresses how to teach ICS cybersecurity to computer
science students. Currently, the majority of students has intermedi-
ate knowledge level of IT cybersecurity but is unfamiliar with ICS
principles. Our work brings two main contributions. First, we share
our experiencewith the design and acquisition of KYPO4INDUSTRY
testbed. Second, we describe a course syllabus to deliver cybersecu-
rity training in a simulated industrial environment. The course uses
a flipped classroom format [6] with hands-on projects replicating
real cyber attacks. The students learn to understand the risks and
gain capabilities to respond to cyber attacks that target ICS.
This paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 provides
an overview of hands-on activities for teaching cybersecurity in
IT and ICS. Section 3 describes the ICS training facility, lists the
main components, and provides implementation details. Section 4
provides a detailed description of the design, content, and assess-
ment methods of the ICS cybersecurity course. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper and outlines future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
Cybersecurity knowledge and skills are usually taught through
classroom lectures complemented with labs, exercises, and home
assignments. Such a combination of theory and practice is essential
in training cybersecurity experts, since the number of cyber attacks
and the ingenuity of attackers is ever-growing. This section presents
the current best practice for teaching cybersecurity in IT and ICS.
2.1 Teaching Cybersecurity in IT
The three most popular types of IT cybersecurity training are hands-
on assignments, capture the flag (CTF) games, and cyber defense
exercises (CDX). Hands-on assignments include working with cy-
bersecurity tools, usually in a virtual environment. An example
collection of such assignments is SecKnitKit [31], a set of virtual
machines (VMs) and corresponding learning materials. Using ready-
made VMs offers a realistic and isolated environment with minimal
setup, which is well-suited for cybersecurity training. Alternatively,
online learning platforms, such as Root Me [23], provide a set of
cybersecurity challenges that the learners solve locally or online.
CTF is a format of cybersecurity games and competitions in
which the learners solve various cybersecurity tasks. Completing
each task yields a textual string called flag, which is worth a certain
amount of points. There are two main variations of the CTF format:
Jeopardy and Attack-Defense.
In Jeopardy CTF, such as PicoCTF [8], learners choose the tasks
to solve from a static collection of challenges presented in a web
interface. The challenges are divided into categories such as cryp-
tography, reverse engineering, or forensics. Learners solve the tasks
locally at their machines or interact with a remote server. Jeopardy
CTFs can thus accommodate hundreds of players at the same time.
In Attack-Defense CTF, such as iCTF [36], teams of learners each
maintain an identical instance of a vulnerable computer network.
Each team must protect its network while exploiting vulnerabilities
in the networks of other teams. Successful attacks yield flags, which,
along with maintaining the availability of the network services,
contribute to the teams’ score.
While anyone can participate in hands-on training or CTF games,
CDX is a complex cybersecurity exercise for professionals, often
from military or government agencies or dedicated cybersecurity
teams [12, 39]. Learners are divided into blue teams responsible
for maintaining and defending a complex network infrastructure
against attacks of an external red team. The blue teams must pre-
serve the availability of the network services for end-users and
respond to prompts from law enforcement groups and journal-
ists. Beyond IT systems, some exercises feature simulated critical
infrastructure (e.g., electricity grid or transportation).
2.2 Teaching Cybersecurity in ICS
Teaching ICS relies on components that are likely to be encountered
in operational environments. Testbeds are built to replicate the be-
havior of ICS and incorporate a control center, communication
architecture, field devices, and physical processes [32]. Holm et al.
surveyed the current ICS testbeds and reported on their objectives
and implementation [17]. Most testbeds focus on cybersecurity –
vulnerability analysis, tests of defense mechanisms, and education.
Testbed fidelity is essential for training activities and the level of pro-
vided courses. High-fidelity testbeds are rare, and most testbeds use
simulations, scaled-down models, and individual components [7].
ICS courses cover beginner and intermediate levels of training.
Virtualized, purely software-based testbeds are built upon virtual
PLCs and devices modeled in software [3]. They can be highly
flexible and imitate any real environment with an arbitrary number
of various devices. Their main drawback is the lack of look and
feel of the operational environment. Users who are accustomed
to using the real equipment might perceive purely software-based
testbeds as a computer game and not as training for real situations.
An example of such testbed is a system for assessment of cyber
threats against networked critical infrastructures [30].
Hardware-based testbeds are used, for example, in training oper-
ating personnel of chemical and nuclear plants. Apart from these,
there are other specialized ones, such as PowerCyber [16], which is
designed to closely resemble power grid communication utilizing
actual field devices and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) software. This testbed allows to explore cyber attacks and
defenses while evaluating their impact on power flow. Ahmed et
al. [1] presented SCADA testbed that demonstrates three industrial
processes (a gas pipeline, a power transmission and distribution
system, and a wastewater treatment plant) in a small scale. To do so,
it employs real-world industrial equipment, such as PLCs, sensors,
or aerators. These are deployed at each physical process system
for local control and monitoring, and the PLCs are connected to a
computer running human-machine interface (HMI) software for
monitoring the status of the physical processes. The testbed is used
in a university course on ICS security. Students can observe the
industrial processes, learn ladder logic programming in various pro-
gramming environments, and observe network traffic of multiple
communication protocols.
In 2016, Antonioli et al. [5] prepared SWaT Security Showdown,
the first CTF event targeted at ICS security. The game employed
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Secure Water Treatment (SWaT), a software-based testbed available
at Singapore University of Technology and Design [22]. Selected
twelve international teams from academia and industry were in-
vited. The game was divided into two phases: online Jeopardy and
on-site Attack-Defense CTF. The first part served as a training ses-
sion and included novel categories related to the ICS realm. The
on-site CTF lasted two days. The teams visited the testbed on the
first day. The next day, they had three hours to attack the SWaT
testbed. The authors devised a dedicated scoring system for the
assessment of attacks launched by the teams. The scoring eval-
uated the impact of the attacks on the physical and monitoring
processes of the testbed, and the ability to conduct attacks that are
not discovered by ICS detection systems deployed in the testbed.
Chothia and de Ruiter [9] developed a course at the University
of Birmingham on penetration testing techniques of off-the-shelf
consumer Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Students were tasked to
analyze device functionality, write up a report, and give a presenta-
tion of their findings.
3 KYPO4INDUSTRY: ICS TRAINING FACILITY
In this section, we describe the hardware and software components
of the ICS testbed. The ICS training takes place in a specialized
physical facility, which has been frequently used for university
courses [37], international CDXs [39], and extracurricular events.
The room contains six large tables, each with three seats, three
desktop PCs, and ICS hardware devices. As Figure 2 shows, the
devices within the testbed infrastructure are interconnected and so
can communicate with each other. The tables are portable to allow
the instructor to rearrange the room for various activities, including
team assignments, student presentations, and group discussions.
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Figure 2: Training facility setup
3.1 Hardware Components
Based on the discussions with our partners and our experience, we
defined these requirements on the hardware components of the
KYPO4INDUSTRY testbed:
• Open-hardware – full access to hardware and software to avoid
vendor-lock and other proprietary limitations, unlimited soft-
ware manipulation, and community support.
• Performance – the PLC processor and memory (RAM, FLASH)
must be sufficient to host operating-system with virtualization
support (containers) and TCP/IP networking.
• Communication interfaces – wired and wireless communication
buses for connecting peripherals and devices in the testbed.
Industry standards like Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, USB, RS-
485, and 1-Wire must cover both IT and ICS environments.
• Inputs – digital inputs to read binary sensors and devices such
as buttons, switches, and motion sensors. Analog inputs to
measure voltage from temperature, pressure, and light sensors.
• Outputs – digital outputs to switch binary actuators (LEDs,
relays, motors), seven-segment displays, and graphical display
(touchscreen) for human-machine interface.
• Physical dimension – hardware setupwhichwill provide a cyber-
physical experience (allow manipulation and observation of
physical processes), multiple devices mounted in the same con-
trol panel, tabletop and mobile setup.
• Safety – durable equipment and a tamper-resistant installa-
tion, all cabling and connectors should be concealed to prevent
(un)intended tampering during hands-on training, and electri-
cal safety – avoid grid power parts.
Figure 3 shows the proposed hardware architecture. The hard-
ware components of the control panel include PLCs, I/O modules,
touchscreen, linear motor, and communication gateway.
I/O Module
PLC
I/O Module
PLC
I/O Module
PLC
I/O Module
PLC
I/O Module
PLC
I/O Module
PLC
Display - Touchscreen
Master
PLC
I/O
Module
Actuator - Linear Motor
Communication Gateway ITNetwork
Figure 3: Control panel block diagram
PLC devices are a fundamental component of the control panel.
When choosing a suitable PLC platform, it was essential for us that
it leverages well-known hardware and has an industrial appearance.
We chose the UniPi platform, which uses the popular Raspberry Pi
single-board computer [15] and industrial casing. The UniPi Neuron
M103 [34] model is used as the master PLC, and slave PLCs use
UniPi Neuron S103 [35]. Both versions use Raspberry Pi 3 Model
B with four-core 1.2 GHz CPU and 1GB RAM. The Neuron PLC is
DIN rail mountable, requires 24V DC power supply, and has the
following interfaces:
• 10/100 Mbit Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth,
• four USB 2.0 ports, Micro SD port,
• RS-485, 1-Wire interface,
• digital input and output pins,
• one analog input and one analog output port.
The control panel uses two I/O module types. The first one
connects the master PLC to three large-area LEDs, two buttons, one
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key switch, and two motion detectors. The master PLC controls
the linear motor through the RS-485 interface. The second type
connects slave PLC with three large-area LEDs, two buttons, high
power led (heating), 1-wire digital thermometer, and light sensor
(analog input). Slave PLC uses RS-485 to control two-digit seven-
segment display and 1.54" e-paper module.
10" LCD touchscreen is used to display technology processes.
Dedicated Raspberry Pi module controls LCD via the HDMI in-
terface and the touch panel via USB. A mechanical demonstrator
(actuator) uses a linear motor. It includes DRV8825 stepper motor
driver, ATmega 328 MCU, two end-stops switches, and three in-
frared position sensors. A network switch (MikroTik CRS125-24G)
connects all PLC devices. Switch manages the flow of data between
PLCs (100 Mbit Ethernet network) and incorporates routing func-
tionality to connect the control panel to the IT network.
We built ten control panels to place at the top of the table and
six as a movable trolley (see Figure 4). The tabletop setup is space-
efficient, and the portable trolley provides mobility. The control
panel is easy to handle; it requires only a power cord to connect to
the mains electricity supply and Ethernet cable to connect to the
IT network. The power consumption of one control panel is less
than the power consumption of a desktop computer (≤ 200W).
Figure 4: Physical hardware setup of the ICS testbed
3.2 Software Components
The physical equipment provides fidelity of the operational en-
vironment, but software is needed to replicate the functions and
behavior of various ICS systems. Figure 5 shows the proposed soft-
ware architecture based on the simplified ISA-95 model.
Sensors
Actuators
Programmable
Logic Devices
Human-Machine
Interface
Cloud
Applications
Figure 5: Interfaces between software components
Based on our experience from developing and delivering hands-
on cybersecurity courses, we defined the following requirements
on software components of KYPO4INDUSTRY testbed:
• Open-source model – access to source code and full software
control, no licensing fees and licensing obstacles, community
support, and collaboration.
• Operating system – a fully-fledged operating system with Rasp-
berry PI support, operating-system-level virtualization, and
high-speed networking.
• Orchestration – the ability to manage all testbed devices - config-
uration management and application deployment, automated
preparation of testbed environment.
• Communication protocols – support for numerous legacy and
emerging communication protocols used in ICS and IT envi-
ronment.
The software stack of ICS testbed includes Linux OS (Debian
optimized for PLC devices), Docker ecosystem [18], and on-premise
OpenStack [14] cloud environment. We combine cloud deployment
(virtual machines in OpenStack) with physical devices (PLCs, sen-
sors, and actuators) to create ICS systems with varying levels of
fidelity.
Automated orchestration of the testbed environment is of utmost
importance. The central testbed controller runs as a virtual appli-
ance. It provides management and monitoring of ICS testbed and
contains Docker repository for PLC devices. The PLC devices are
pre-installed with Debian OS and enabled Docker support. Using
Docker containers simplifies software deployment and configura-
tion of testbed components.
The openness of the used software allows us to implement vir-
tually any new software component. We focus on two use-cases:
widely deployed systems and new emerging technologies. Com-
munication protocols and application interfaces are essential to
creating a complete ICS system. There are dozens of industrial
protocols, and many new protocols are being proposed every year.
Widely deployed protocols are Modbus and DNP3 [19]. They have
been used for decades for communications between ICS devices.
The new emerging protocols represent MQTT [24] and REST [28].
4 ICS CYBERSECURITY COURSE DESIGN
This section presents our proposed ICS cybersecurity course that
employs the ICS testbed. While the previous section described the
hardware and software components of the testbed, it did not deal
with content. One of our motivations for this course, apart from stu-
dent learning, is that the students will create training content for the
testbed. When writing this section, we followed the guidelines for
planning new courses [40] and Joint Task Force on Cybersecurity
Education (JTF) Cybersecurity Curricula 2017 [26].
4.1 Course Goals and Covered Topics
The overall goal of the course is to provide undergraduate students
with an awareness of threats within the ICS domain via hands-on
experience. As in the authentic learning framework [21], the focus is
on solving real-world problems and learning by doing. The students’
final product of the course is a training game for exercising both
attacks at and defense of a selected industrial process. Our students
previously created such games in the IT domain [37].
The primary JTF curriculum Knowledge Area (KA) the course
covers is System Security, with Knowledge Units (KU) of Common
System Architectures, System Thinking, and System Control. The
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secondary KAs are Component Security (KU Component Testing),
Connection Security (KU Network Defense), Data Security (KU
Secure Communication Protocols), and Organizational Security
(KU Systems Administration). We also marginally include the KA
Social Security (KUs Cybercrime and Cyber Law). Finally, the course
focuses not only on technical skills but also enables students to
exercise communication, presentation skills, and time management.
4.2 Course Format
The course is aimed at computer science university students, namely
undergraduates with a basic background in computer networks and
security. The recommended prerequisite is completing our Cyber
Attack Simulation course in the IT domain [37]. The initial run of
the course is prepared for 6 students; however, the training facility
described in Section 3 can accommodate up to 20 students who
can work in pairs using the 16 control panels (see Figure 4). The
course spans the whole semester (13 weeks). It is taught in a flipped
classroom format [6] with 2-hour long weekly lab sessions, various
homework assignments, and a hands-on semester project.
The necessary infrastructure includes, apart from the ICS testbed,
also a CTF game infrastructure for running students’ games (such
as CTFd [10] or KYPO cyber range platform [38]), and Gitlab repos-
itories for students’ projects. We appreciate the effort of the open-
source community, such as learning resources, documentation, and
countless projects [2, 13, 33], whichwill help students to understand
the used software.
4.3 Course Syllabus
Table 1 provides an overview of the course syllabus, student deliv-
erables, and assessment methods. The course is divided into three
parts: basics of ICS, development of an ICS training game, and its
presentation and submission.
ICS Principles. Sincewe expect the students to have little knowledge
of ICS, the first class session will motivate the topic by presenting
examples of past cyber attacks such as Stuxnet [20]. The goal is
to demonstrate the real-world impact of ICS incidents. We will
follow by explaining the related terms, such as critical information
infrastructures, and the corresponding legal regulations (such as a
national Act on cybersecurity). For their homework, the students
will individually choose a real, publicly-known attack on ICS and
present it to others next class (in 15 minutes, including Q&A). After
the presentations, the homework assigned in week 2 will be reading
this paper and the papers we reference in the related work.
In week 3, the students familiarize themselves with the ICS
testbed. They will complete several hands-on labs to learn the basic
operational features of HW and SW components of the testbed. At
the end of the class, they will discuss in groups how to demonstrate
the known attacks using ICS testbed. As an individual homework as-
signment, they will search for existing ICS security threat landscape
reports/lists, like the OWASP Internet of Things Project [27].
The following week, each student will present their results. The
group will discuss the severity of each threat, and which of them
can or cannot be demonstrated on the KYPO4INDUSTRY testbed
to understand the capabilities and limitations of the testbed. The
individual homework for the next week will be to prepare a 1-page
written survey of CTF games in the ICS domain.
In the week 5 class, the students will engage in a pair activity of
merging their reports to create a shared list of existing CTF games
for the whole class. The motivation is to have a knowledge base of
inspiration for students’ games. The activity will followwith a short
discussion centered around the question, “What features should
an engaging game have?” The instructor will then briefly lecture
on the principles of gamification [4] and provide an illustrative
example to help students in their later assignment. The homework
for the next week will be to think about a topic of student’s game,
which processes and threats the student will focus on, and how the
student can use the ICS testbed for it. The instructor will highlight
the specifics of ICS processes, and point out that they are threatened
by different types of attacks than conventional IT systems. This
homework starts the semester project phase.
Game Development. Week 6 starts with an activity in which pairs
of students “peer-review” each others’ discovered threats using
the Security Threat Modelling Cards [11]. Students who finish will
proceed to one-on-one consultations with the instructor to discuss
the topic and the process of the game (output of the previous home-
work). Afterward, the students start working on the game narrative
(storyline) and design the game flow, including the separation of
tasks into levels. For their homework, the students will finish this
design and send the draft to the instructor to receive formative
feedback. The instructor will review the drafts and send comments
before the next class.
In week 7, students will individually continue to develop their
game, particularly the PLC-related part (Layer 1 of the ISA-95 ar-
chitecture, see Figure 1). The instructor will then briefly lecture on
the importance of the proper setting of learning outcomes and pre-
requisites, including examples from existing games. The students
will use these instructions in their homework and add the learning
outcomes and prerequisites to the description of their game.
Week 8 is dedicated to finishing the development of the PLC-
related part and development and configuration of the Supervisory
part (Layer 2 of the ISA-95 architecture). Students have to deliver
an alpha version of their game for the dry run before the next class.
Week 9 starts with the dry run of students’ games in pairs. Each
student plays the game of another student for 45 minutes and takes
notes about the learning experience. Then they switch roles. After-
ward, the students are instructed on how to file a good bug report
and report their feedback on the game in Gitlab. The instructor
will review the submitted bug reports before the next class. The
optional homework is to improve the games based on the dry run.
Week 10 starts with a short presentation of demonstrative exam-
ples of filed bug reports chosen by the instructor. For the rest of
the class, students improve the games based on the feedback from
the dry run.
In week 11, the students document their game and automate its
deployment in the ICS testbed. They must submit the final version
of their game three days before the next class, the course finale.
Game Presentation and Submission. In week 12, the students take
part in organizing a Hacking Day – a public event during which
other students of the university can play the created games. This
event has two goals: motivating the students to work on their
projects and popularizing ICS cybersecurity. Our experience from
hosting such an event in the IT domain is described in [37].
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Table 1: The schedule and the structure of the ICS cybersecurity course, along with the student deliverables and their contri-
bution to the total course grade (with 10% being for active participation in class), and important tasks for the instructor
Week Class content Student homework task (% of the grade) Instructor tasks
1 Motivation, real attacks, legal issues Prepare a presentation about an ICS attack (5%) —
2 Student presentations of chosen attacks Read this paper and some of the references Grade the presentations
3 Hands-on labs on ICS testbed familiarization Write an ICS security threat landscape report (5%) —
4 Threat discussion, demo on ICS testbed Write a short survey of CTF games in ICS (5%) Grade the reports
5 Merge surveys, introduce game concepts Select threats for your game Grade the surveys
6 Threat modeling, storyline, consultation Write a game draft Check the game drafts
7 Preparing ICS part, educational objectives Add learning outcomes and prerequisites Check the game drafts
8 Preparing ICS and IT part Prepare an alpha version of the game Deploy the games
9 Dry run of the games with peers Improve the game, submit bug reports (5%) Review bug reports
10 Bug presentations, game improvement Improve the game —
11 Documentation, automation, deployment Submit the game for presentation (50%) Deploy the games
12 Public run of the games Write a reflection from the public run (5%) Oversee the event
13 Final reflections Fix any issues that emerged in the public run (15%) Grade the games
Finally, week 13 is dedicated to students’ reflections and the
Hacking Day wrap-up in a focus group discussion. If any issues
emerged in their game during the Hacking Day, they must fix them.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We shared the design details of KYPO4INDUSTRY, a testbed for
teaching ICS cybersecurity in a hands-on way. Moreover, we pro-
posed a novel university course that employs the testbed. The
students will practically learn about threats associated with the ICS
domain, develop an educational cyber game, and exercise their soft
skills during multiple public presentations. The acquired skills will
be essential for the computer science undergraduates who will be
responsible for cybersecurity operations of an entire organization
in their future career. We suppose that more organizations will em-
ploy cyber-physical systems, and so understanding of ICS-specific
features will constitute an advantage for the prospective graduates.
5.1 Experience and Lessons Learned
Although using simple microprocessor systems (e.g., development
boards) in teaching is popular, these systems do not replicate com-
plex ICSs. Cyber-physical systems are unique and change with the
physical process they control. The proposed testbed provides ten
tabletop control panels and six mobile installations. In total, stu-
dents can work with 148 PLCs, which use the popular Raspberry Pi
single-board computers. The individual components (PLCs, sensors,
actuators) are available off the shelf; however, the challenge is to
build a hardware setup that will replicate the ICS in a laboratory en-
vironment. Addressing this challenge involves multiple engineering
professions and requires external collaboration.
5.2 Future Work
The presented testbed is modular; therefore, it can be gradually
upgraded as new advances in the field will emerge in the future.
We rely on open-source components that are supported by large
communities of users and developers. Still, there is room for future
work on the content of training scenarios and novel instruction
methods in the ICS domain. Another interesting research idea is to
develop methods for creating cyber games and compare whether
they work the same in the IT and ICS domain.
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